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The Misconceived Search for Global Law 
 
Martin Loughlin 
 
 
The social acceleration of time and the social compression of space are today combining 
to produce changes in economic, political, and cultural relations. These changes have had 
consequential effects on legal relations, exhibited most obviously by the degree to which 
national legal orders are now permeated by international and transnational norms. Such 
developments are of major social and political significance, but their impacts on legal 
orders remain contentious. Some jurists—the avant-garde—claim that the changes are so 
profound that they register at the most basic epistemological level: they argue that they 
are bringing about a fundamental shift in the very idea of law. This is the jurisprudential 
question that Neil Walker examines in his new book on Intimations of Global Law.1 
 
 Many of the more innovative claims made by avant-garde legal scholars—that 
these changes signal a juristic ‘paradigm-shift’ or are creating a new era characterised by a 
radical pluralism of legal orders—are, I believed, misconceived and cannot be sustained. 
Contemporary developments may be important, but insofar as they unsettle received 
ideas about law and government, my own response has been to return to basics and 
examine the ways in which jurists have characterised the constitution of political 
authority.2 In doing so, my objective has been to refashion such fundamental concepts as 
state, sovereignty and constitution to show that modern practice is more nuanced than 
post-statists, post-sovereigntists and hyper-constitutionalists imagine. But Walker’s 
response presents those (like me) he labels ‘statists’ (pp180-1) with an intriguing and 
more challenging case.  
 
Like avant-garde jurists, Walker seeks not only to analyse the range and nature of 
these changes but also to address the challenges they present at the most basic level of 
juristic reconstruction. But unlike Mattias Kumm, he does not assert that it is ushering in 
                                                        
1 N Walker, Intimations of Global Law (Cambridge University Press, 2015): bracketed references in the text 
refer to this book. 
2 M Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2003); id. Foundations of Public Law (Oxford: 
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a paradigmatic shift in understanding;3 unlike Miguel Maduro, he does not adopt a radical 
constitutional pluralism that can lead only to a hyper-constitutionalist monism; 4  and 
unlike Gunther Teubner he does not abandon the modern framing of the public and the 
political in order to replace it with the social and the regulatory.5 Walker, by contrast, 
swaps an emphatic for an interrogatory style. His method is to map cautiously these 
developments and, rather than making some bold claim that they bring about a shift in 
law’s meaning, to ask a number of rudimentary questions about their implications for the 
concept of law. 
 
Walker’s objective in his book is to advance an inquiry first laid out in his 
inaugural lecture on assuming Edinburgh’s Regius Chair in 2008.6 There, he identified 
unity, authority, effectiveness and situatedness as the basic structural characteristics of 
modern law against which the significance of recent developments are to be assessed. He 
claimed that these developments were leading to spatial and temporal displacement such 
that law’s modern coordinates are now being placed in question. The emergence of 
‘certain increasingly prominent sites of jurisgenerative activity’ are, he suggested, 
‘evocative of a break with the situational logic of the legal constellation of modernity’.7 
 
Illustrations of such sites of displacement include an incipient ‘pluri-constitutive 
law’ in the European Union and the many varieties of ‘Global Administrative Law’ that 
have arisen because of ‘the increasing propensity for the administration of collective 
goods, and in particular administrative rule-making, to take place on a transnational basis 
in the absence of direct authority from either national constitutional sources or 
international treaty sources’. 8  Such innovations, he contends, have a ‘transformative 
potential’ because of ‘the novel ways in which they configure themselves’ and they are 
leading to ‘the further erosion of the Westphalian pillars’.9 But his inaugural discourse 
remains exploratory in tone and it ends with two questions: ‘Does the fact that much of 
                                                        
3 M Kumm, ‘The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship between 
Constitutionalism in and beyond the State’ in JL Dunoff and JP Trachtman (eds), Ruling the World? 
Constitutionalism, International Law and Global Governance (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 258-324. 
4 Miguel Poiares Maduro, ‘Three Claims of Constitutional Pluralism’ in M Avbelj and J Komárek (eds) 
Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Hart, 2012), 67-84. 
5 G. Teubner, Constitutional Fragments: Societal Constitutionalism in Globalization (Oxford University Press, 
2014). 
6 Neil Walker, ‘Out of Place and Out of Time: Law’s Fading Co-ordinates’ (2010) 14 Edinburgh Law Review 
13. 
7 Ibid 38. 
8 Ibid 42. 
9 Ibid 44. 
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this new uncharted law seems at least in some respects out of place with our received 
understanding of law mean that law as we know it in that received understanding is 
running out of time? And to the extent that it is, the unavoidable but impossible question 
with which we must end is whether this is a good or a bad thing.’10 
 
 These are big questions and we turn to Intimations of Global Law in the hope of 
receiving answers. The book is a tour de force. It provides a concise and comprehensive 
overview of the range of juristic consequences of globalising developments. It engages in 
careful analysis, warning of the dangers, on the one hand, of overreach generated by the 
impulse to latch on to a trendy label and, on the other, of scepticism born of nostalgia 
for a lost world. It is erudite, relentlessly abstract, and remains focused on the key 
jurisprudential question. As Walker now formulates it, that question is whether these 
developments are not only of empirical or rhetorical significance but also ‘speak to a shift 
in how we think about and seek to develop and present law’s credentials as law’ (p.26). 
But although the book leaves us much better informed, it does not answer the question. 
We are left only with the sense that law is ‘a less grounded and less embedded form, a 
more malleable and more precarious category’ (p.205).  
 
Some would say that, given the present state of affairs, this is the only sensible 
answer that can be given. But from what Walker calls the sceptical statist stance, I want 
to suggest that answers cannot be found because the entire exercise of the avant-garde 
jurists is misconceived. It is misconceived for four related reasons: first, because, 
contrary to what they seem to believe, the juristic claims they make are not new; 
secondly, because they seek inappropriately to convert a series of empirical issues into 
conceptual claims; thirdly, because they are able to promote such conceptual claims only 
by wrongly identifying the character of modern law; and finally because, although there is 
an important issue to be raised by contemporary developments, this—a politico-legal 
issue—is one that they avoid.  
 
The legal-conceptual questions raised are not new. Avant-garde jurists may have 
latched on to a phenomenon called ‘globalisation’ in order to display their cutting-edge 
credentials, but the jurisprudential question underpinning these globalising trends is as 
old as the modern phenomenon of law. Consider, by way of example, Henri de Saint-
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Simon’s argument in the early-nineteenth century that the French Revolution had veered 
out of control because, rather than operating according to scientific principles, it had 
been dominated by lawyers imbued with metaphysical ideas. Authority in the modern 
world, he suggested, could be acquired only by demonstrating the material benefits that 
government confers: authority is generated by supplying collective goods that enhance 
the security, wellbeing and happiness of subjects. 11  Reformulated in jurisprudential 
language, Saint-Simon was saying that the idea of law as the expression of will, and 
especially the will of political majorities, must be jettisoned and replaced with a modern 
conception of law as a co-ordinating mechanism. Law is not (political) will: it is a 
regulatory technique. 
 
Saint-Simon’s faithful secretary then presented his argument in a more pithy 
form. Metaphysics, Auguste Comte declared, must be replaced by social physics, and the 
government of men replaced by the administration of things.12 This adage was soon 
borrowed by Friedrich Engels and adopted as a pillar of scientific communism. Stripped 
of its emancipatory telos, this is the conceptual foundation of the claims made for global 
law. Latching on to a crude version of legal positivism that suggests that law in 
modernity is a set of rules made by the will of the state’s legislator, the avant-garde jurists 
assert, first, that many things with law-like characteristics no longer have their originating 
source in legislative will and, secondly, that rather than being commands they are best 
conceived as sophisticated regulatory devices. Proportionality, subsidiarity, burden-
sharing, emissions-trading, experimental governance, smart-sanctioning, nudging, 
outcasting: if these are exemplary techniques of global law (Ch.5) then its emergence 
seems only to signal the realisation of Saint-Simon’s claim. Global law presents itself as 
the science of the administration of things.  
 
Reflecting on its character with reference to the competing conceptions of 
modern law as ratio and voluntas, Walker submits that global law ‘sounds in both basic 
templates … but more as ratio’ (pp.196-7). He might have been bolder. Global law is 
ratio; it is the expression of a type of instrumental reason that informs the guidance, 
control and evaluation mechanisms of the many regulatory regimes that now permeate 
contemporary life. But does the emergence of so-called ‘global law’ displace ‘our received 
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understanding of law’? And is that ‘a good or a bad thing’? I want first to suggest that it 
is not a good thing to assume that these empirical developments in regulatory practice 
resound at the level of the concept. The question is not whether the extension of 
transnational regulatory regimes is a good or bad thing: that can only be answered 
through sociological analysis or, perhaps, by adopting an intuitive judgement. The key 
question is whether we should assume that the concepts of law and regulation can now 
be fused. 
 
There are, I suggest, significant differences between the concepts of law and 
regulation, a point often blurred by those who conceive law simply as normative order. 
This is a mistake: a legal order is, in essence, a concrete and effective unity and the norms 
generated by that legal order are derivative phenomena. Law is not normative order: it is 
an institution which has a firm and lasting identity that persists even as its membership 
and normative structures change through time.13 This claim does not resolve the issues 
raised by globalising developments, not least because it suggests that there are as many 
legal orders as there are institutions. But by placing the focus of inquiry onto the 
institution as an effective operating entity rather than on norms or regulatory 
mechanisms it brings about a more sensible re-alignment.  
 
Once this adjustment is made, the questions raised about the emergence of 
transnational regulatory regimes seem not to be of a conceptual nature. The first 
question is: are the various emerging regimes ‘institutions’? If the answer is affirmative, 
then, rather than examining these institutions as some new species whose existence 
might give rise to a new genus of law, the questions become more prosaic; they are not 
legal-conceptual but sociological. Are these new regimes derivative institutions or have 
they been able to acquire an autonomous status? Do they perform limited and particular 
functions or are their aims of a general nature? And perhaps most importantly: having 
mapped the network of institutions, can a credible account be given of the power 
relations that operate across this network? 
 
In the modern world, the state (understood as a centralised agency of rule) is 
commonly recognised to have acquired a predominant status as ‘the institution of 
                                                        
13 S Romano, The Legal Order [1918] M Croce trans (Routledge, 2017); M Hauriou, ‘The Theory of the 
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institutions’. Most—but not all—institutions have derived their existence or mode of 
operation either from the state’s actions or its acquiescence. Some scholars now argue 
that globalisation displaces this political reality. This is important, but it is an empirical 
rather than a conceptual question, on which the evidence presently is inconclusive.14 For 
this reason, the emergence of the avant-garde jurists seems mainly to signal the growing 
influence of a new strain of legal conceptualism, one that seeks conceptual solutions to 
sociological questions. Neil Walker’s may be the most subtle, nuanced and open-minded 
of these exercises, but this does not mean he has been able to avoid that trap. 
 
I have tried to show that the avant-garde jurists are not making a novel claim 
about law, are able to claim that a fundamental shift is occurring only by 
mischaracterising modern law, and have inappropriately converted empirical issues into 
conceptual claims. I come now to the final criticism, the reason why—on explicitly 
normative grounds—jurists should be reluctant to embrace the suggestion that law might 
now be conceived as regulation rather than institution.   
 
Recent developments have certainly challenged the standing of the state as the 
institution of institutions, but this registers primarily as a crisis of the political rather than 
the legal. This is because the institutions formed as a consequence of globalisation are 
mainly regulatory agencies that possess an economic-technical rationale. A complex 
network of governmental institutions has emerged, many of which operate at arms-
length from the state and may not have been established through an exercise of the 
state’s will. This may or may not displace the pivotal role of states in this network—that 
is an empirical question—but more significantly it undermines the notion of the political 
as the domain in which collective unity is maintained. Rather than leading to a general 
jurisprudential crisis, it generates a political crisis born of the difficulty of sustaining the 
idea of ‘the people’ as a symbolic representation of collective will formation. 
  
If, as I suggest, this is primarily a crisis of representation of political authority, 
then it resonates in the metaphysics of sovereignty rather than the empirics of 
government. The political challenge is to find an adequate expression of collective 
political agency. Although it generates legal problems, these concern public law—public 
law as political jurisprudence—rather than positive law in general. The crisis is acute 
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mainly because, unlike the social that operates on status categories and the economic 
operating on ability to pay, the political is the domain of equality. And it is through 
political imagination that the social bonds of those collective groups we call nation-states 
have been maintained.  
 
The nation-state should certainly not be fetishised but, notwithstanding its 
constitutive tensions, the way that the institution has been able to manage difference and 
generate strong bonds of solidarity should also not be underemphasised. Globalisation 
has opened borders, expanded minds, and created new solidarities. But equivalence 
between the solidarities of humanity and citizenship cannot be assumed. The solidarity of 
humanity, Pierre Rosanvallon notes, is a minimal duty that we owe to ‘keep people from 
suffering death by hunger or genocide’; this, according to UN estimates, requires the 
allocation of around 1 percent of the world’s wealth. The solidarity of citizenship calls 
for the preservation of a common physical and social infrastructure, the promotion of 
equality of opportunity and the maintenance of a relative equality of living standards, and 
that requires somewhere between 35 and 50 percent of the nation’s wealth.15  
 
The crisis we face today has arisen because cosmopolitan sensibilities have been 
extended while civil sensibilities have declined. This is the fundamental problem, and is 
one for which global law offers no solution. This is a problem of a political imagination 
which historically has been sustained by a civil religion that conceives the people as a 
unity. It generates problems in public law because this is the medium through which this 
institutional edifice is maintained. If the crisis is not overcome, we will be left with 
markets, regulatory agencies, basic rights, ‘public opinion’, and an emaciated sense of 
solidarity. We might get global regulation—the realisation of global law—but I cannot 
see how that will be able to sustain a common world. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
15 P Rosanvallon, ‘From the Past to the Future of Democracy’ in his Democracy: Past and Future S Moyn ed. 
(Columbia University Press, 2006), 216-7. 
